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1 In La lecture comme jeu (1986), Michel Picard remarks upon the increasingly ludic nature
of  texts,  both  in  contemporary literature  and  in  popular  genres  like  thrillers.  The
involvement of the reader, figuring out clues, making indirect connections and treating
the narrative voice with playful scepticism, is undoubtedly a widespread phenomenon,
while genres like the “choose your own adventure books” deliberately blur the line
between narrative and game. However, Picard adds that playfulness has always been
part of the reading experience, although perhaps in less obvious ways: many forms that
are now seen as “serious” literature were formerly considered as games (Picard 1986:
195). Rather than thinking of this hybridization as a process, invented by someone at a
certain juncture to mesh the two distinct activities of reading and playing, it may be
more fruitful to wonder if these in-between forms do not, in fact, tap into something
inherent in all reading.
2 Reader-response theories have long used the metaphor of games and playing — which
are both inherent in Picard’s notion of “jeu” — to define and describe the activity of
reading.  Louise-Michelle  Rosenblatt  presents  an  apt  explanation  as  to  why  this
metaphor is  so prevalent:  to understand reading,  theoreticians must go beyond the
traditional vision of the reader as a passive audience. “The reader’s creation of a poem
out of a text must be an active, self-ordering, self-correcting process” (Rosenblatt 1978:
11). The process of playing games provides a perfect template to articulate these three
points: not only are games actively played, but the players “order” their own moves by
conforming to some code of rules, and they make mistakes, from which they can learn
in  order  to  perform  better.  Nearly  all  reader-response  theories  rely  on  this  basic
parallel, highlighting the active, ordered and non-linear process that reading entails.
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3 However, a game is much more than an interactive, iterative process based on rules. It
is a human activity, with myriads of variations involving different processes, goals and
faculties.  From  children  pretending  to  inhabit  a  fantasy  world  with  ever-changing
rules,  to  a  gambler  betting  it  all  on  the  roll  of  a  dice,  to  martial  artists  or  chess
champions performing a highly ritualised set of attacks and counters, games can be
widely different. One may wonder to what extent the complex and still ongoing debates
between competing conceptions of reading can be understood by asking what kind of
game the reader is actually playing. Going into the precise details of the metaphor of
reading as a game leads us to question not only the process itself, its structures and the
rules that govern it, but also what is at stake, the personal and social values attached to
reading.  Just  as games are a  mirror of  those who invent and play them, visions of
reading imply a certain stance towards interpersonal  and social  interactions,  and a
certain idea of their end-goals — that is to say, in the Aristotelian sense of the term, a
vision of ethics.
4 This article presents an overview of several reader-response theories, focusing on how
they metaphorically or concretely link the activity of reading to different forms of play.
I will first present the structuralist and phenomenological approaches, which define
reading as taking up a set of established rules and enacting a ritualised performance,
with a view to reaching a pre-determined set of end-goals which all the participants
can agree on. Just like a game of chess ends on indisputable victories, draws or defeats,
and a dramatic or musical performance can be deemed good or bad depending on its
faithfulness to the original score, reading according to these theories follows scripts
and  can  be  considered  and  judged  accordingly.  However,  such  conceptions  are
confronted  with  two  major  problems.  The  first  is  that  some  texts,  especially  in
modernist  and  post-modernist  literature,  deliberately  blur  the  rules  that  govern
reading. By creating unsolvable ambiguities or giving contradictory information, they
jeopardize the very ritual that is supposed to make them readable. The second is the
fact that some readings can be artistically valuable and meaningful while eschewing or
distorting the rules. While it is always possible to dismiss such a use of the text, by
considering it as perverse or eccentric, other theories embrace this form of playfulness,
and construe a definition of reading which makes room for it.
5 Theories of that kind tend to insist on the notion of “free play”, in some form or other.
They emphasise the rights of the reader and the inherent singularity of each new act of
reading as a unique event. Be it from a psychoanalytical perspective, as in the works of
Michel Picard, or from the deconstructionist standpoint of Jacques Derrida, reading is
defined by its contextual and creative aspect. Like the play of children, it takes up pre-
existing elements, but never combines them twice in the same way, so that each new
reading involves an irreducible fragment of chance. Like Stéphane Mallarmé’s roll of
the dice, each reading constitutes a new gamble, which never abolishes chance, never
creates  a  fixed  new  protocol.  Nevertheless,  this  inherent  creativity  must  not  be
confused with pure arbitrariness, nor does the contextual nature of the reading event
make it totally free. On the contrary, theories that highlight free play also claim that
there is a specific form of seriousness to reading as a gamble, that its openness involves
another set of values.
6 This is why it is necessary, I would argue, to also think of reading as a game with stakes.
Far from being a disinterested operation of one’s free will,  reading always happens
within certain parameters, and is always the response to a certain call from within the
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text. The rules that govern the reading of texts do not represent abstract ideals: they
are embedded within their rhetorical structures and rely on broader social and cultural
forces. This  is  why I  think that  the pragmatic  model  of  reading proposed by Jean-
Jacques Lecercle bridges the gap between proponents of reading as a structured game
and those that stress the possibility of free play. It puts obedience (the realisation of
the ritual)  and subversion (the breaking of  rules in order to effect  another type of
performance) on the same plane as possible forms of responses to an interpellation. A
text does not offer one meaning to strive for, but a number of positions from which to
interact with its contents, some of which its rhetorical apparatus favours and some of
which it  sidelines. Those postures even include closing the book or looking out the
window, for instance — both actions which readers can take in response to stimuli from
certain  books.  Most  importantly,  each  reader’s  reaction  also  comes  to  bear  some
meaning. Even closing a book amounts to taking a stance, and this revelatory aspect of
all  possible  responses  may  be  seen  as  the  basis  for  a  form of  dialectic  evaluation,
bearing both on the text and on readers themselves.This article posits that the notion
of agôn is fundamental in understanding what game the reader is playing. The word
agôn, in its original Greek context, was used mainly in the context of competitive sport.
It implies that the confrontation with another is inherently revelatory. In the case of
reading, our reaction to the otherness of the text, whatever it may be, cannot but have
implications  on  our  very  identity.  Our  choice  to  take  on  certain  roles,  to  obey  or
disobey the rhetorical guidance of the text, is directly linked to our way of responding
to all forms of cultural and social interpellations. It is precisely because none of these
messages have a fixed authority over their interpretation, or transcendent claims to
our obedience, that choosing to obey or refuse them is so crucial. As Paul B. Armstrong
puts  it,  “parity  between  the  worlds  of  text  and  reader  [...]  would  mean  that  the
authority of the conventions governing both are at play and at risk” (Armstrong 11). In
the end, the challenge that texts pose, to confront them or to accept them, to reduce
them  to  predetermined  protocols  or  open  them  up  to  incalculable  gambles,  is
fundamental in the construction of our identity as readers and as human beings. This is
the often unspoken yet decisive game that every reader plays.
 
Playing Chess and Playing Music: Reception theories
and the traditional metaphors of reading
7 In Lector in Fabula, Umberto Eco compares reading to a game of chess (Eco 1986: 117).
This simile underscores a certain vision of the interaction with texts, which stands at
the  core  of  his  theory.  Eco  understands  texts  as  frameworks,  sets  of  rules  and
possibilities, which remain incomplete, and require a form of actualisation. Using the
common knowledge of a certain culture, what Eco calls its “encyclopedia”, the text sets
up scenarios, from which the reader is supposed to expect a number of consequences.
This enables the reader to enact complementary reading strategies, looking for hints
and  reconstructing  the  narrated  events  in  order  to  fit  certain  “interpretive
hypotheses”, that is to say to provisionally give meaning to what he or she is reading.
8 This interaction coalesces in two abstract figures: the Model Reader, as the hypothesis
of a reader who would enact the perfect series of interpretive movements to attain a
total understanding of the text, and the Model Author, the representation of all the
interpretive virtualities of the text as intentional discursive strategies (“The Author
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wants us to understand this” would be the symbolic equivalent of “the text’s structure
leads to such an interpretation”) (Eco 1986: 71; 81). Like in a game of chess, the web of
narrative and stylistic devices within a text defines a set of possible moves, some more
fruitful than others, and the “model” reader and author are abstract figures always
playing the best  possible  move in a  given situation to  create  the most  appropriate
interaction within the parameters. The other possibilities include imperfect moves, for
instance a more superficial interpretation, but not breaking the rules.  In a game of
chess, swiping the pieces off with one’s arm in anger or departing from the table are
not moves, and do not need to be recorded as such. Only what constitutes “textual
cooperation” in some form or another is the subject of Eco’s research (Eco 1986: 236).
9 This  structural  representation  of  reading  makes  for  effective  and  cogent
interpretations, especially when dealing with texts that play on hints and require a
certain form of reconstruction from readers, such as mysteries and thrillers. However,
its vision of the “encyclopedia” as a fixed, structural container for all the meanings and
connotations  of  a  given  word  or  phrase,  raises  questions.  It  seems  to  externalise
something as intimate as the relation that each of us has with language.
10 Conversely,  phenomenological  approaches  have  tried  to  integrate  the  original
perspective  and  relation  to  the  world  of  the  individual  reader  in  their  reflection.
Instead of seeing the act of reading as a logically determined game, on the model of
chess, they tend to rely instead on metaphors of theatrical or musical interpretation. In
The Act of Reading (1976), Wolfgang Iser likens reading to taking up a role. This position
keeps the reader in charge of how exactly the role is played, but nevertheless “commits
him to a point of view”, which is embedded within “a certain textual structure” (Iser
1976: 71).  The “selective” interpretation is inscribed within a “horizon of meaning”
(75), which is to say that the text acts upon its reader, giving hints as to how it should
be construed. Borrowing from J. L. Austin’s pragmatics, Iser calls this the “illocutory
force” of fiction: it is meant to produce effects on us as readers. Through its rhetorical
structure, it  asks us to adhere to its perspective, and “construct the context for its
reception” (114). As in Eco’s vision of reading as a game of chess, Iser sees the text as
delineating a reader-figure, the “implied reader”, which actual readers are supposed to
follow, or at least to integrate in a dialectics with their own preconceptions (Iser 1978:
293). The goal of interpretation is hence a form of harmonisation between the reading
public and the “implied reader” which the text calls for.
11 The  notion  of  a  dialectics  leading  to  harmony  is  a  fundamental  tenet  of
phenomenological  approaches.  It  underlies  what  Hans  Robert  Jauss  calls  the
“conciliation of horizons of expectations”, which is not a structural effect of the text,
but is  defined by Jauss as a duty of  the reader (Jauss 1988:  434).  Phenomenological
approaches tend to imply a form of value judgement, whereby the reader is morally
encouraged  to  enact  such  a  conciliation.  This  ties  in  with  a  broader  philosophical
movement, rising from a certain reading of Hegel and of the concept of “recognition”,
which posits that human understanding is a goal in itself. Jürgen Habermas is perhaps
the clearest advocate of “communicational understanding” as the end-goal of rational
human interactions,  and the desire for “intersubjective recognition” as the basis  of
communications (Habermas 1987: 27; 32).
12 This  underlying  assumption  leads  phenomenological  reception  theories  to  relegate
tensions and conflict  to a secondary role.  Iser explains that the model for tensions
within works of fiction is the beau désordre of Marivaux: it is inherently provisional, and
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its own dialectical movement leads to its resolution. In concrete terms, this means that,
when confronted with complexities and tensions, the reader is supposed to “participate
in the solution” by finding a new interpretation, and reintegrating the anomaly within
a broader  frame  (Iser  1976:  91).  In  Iser’s  theory,  this  breaking  and  remoulding  of
assumptions  constitutes  the  hallmark  of  a  literary  style,  as  opposed  to  texts  that
propose only to reinforce existing stereotypes (Iser 1978: 284) However, it ensues that
in certain cases, the reader must relinquish freedom in order to follow a certain path:
“the communication between the text and the reader can only produce a felicitous
outcome if it is under control” (Iser 1976: 297). Consequently, the reader is supposed to
have agency only when the text leaves an opening in “places of indetermination”; even
then, the potential for disjunction is limited (297). In the end, just like a chess player
has a fixed number of moves to play and a performer only a limited amount of freedom
within the parameters of a playtext or musical score, conceptions of reading that rely
on these metaphors tend to highlight the “limits of interpretation”, to paraphrase the
title of one of Eco’s essays. They “aim [...] at producing a possible reader whose profile
is designed by and within the text” (Eco 1990: 52).
13 Although this line of thinking produces undeniably elegant analyses, delineating forms
of “perfect reading” called for by the very structure of the text, it is of limited use when
applied to more chaotic or confused situations. This of course includes complex texts.
The  works  of  James  Joyce,  in  particular,  have  often  been presented within  reader-
response theories as a sort of margin within the literary corpus, which both fascinates
and baffles theoreticians.  As early as his seminal work Opera Aperta (1962),  Eco saw
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) as a “terrifying document” on the possibilities of semantic
ambiguity and formal instability, and the symbol of a temptation to go beyond all the
accepted codes that make texts understandable (Eco 1962: 257; 288). Eco’s attempts to
affirm  the  “internal  logic”  of  a  totalizing  Joycean  “encyclopedia”  in  The  Limits  of
Interpretation (1990) have to come with a caveat on the irreducible “play” with these
notions within the text. Likewise, Iser’s musings on Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), which lead
him to deduce that the text abandons all possibilities of synthesis in order to create an
“experience”, reveal the inability of Iser’s theoretical frame to explain the process of
reading Joyce in terms other than negative (Iser 1989: 23-4). Rather than being fully
explained by these lines of thinking, some works seem to remain at their limit, and call
into  question  the  very  possibility  of  a  comprehensive  model  of  reception  theories.
These theories  also tend to ignore that  readers can,  and often do,  break the rules,
cheat, or otherwise subvert the rituals that govern the “right” way of reading. Picard
remarks that ideas such as that of pacts or duties of the reader exorcise the “tacit,
obscure,  uncontrolled”  aspects  of  reading,  which  in  reality  is  a  “dangerous  game”
(Picard 1986: 165). In doing so, we may wonder if they do not also impose a certain
standard  set  of  values,  which  restores  the  basic  structures  of authority  and
intentionality by asking of the reader to accept a form of transcendent guidance —
even if they replace the traditional Author figure with the rhetorical structure of the
text. As Rosenblatt argues, the notion of a predictive text often hides a willingness to
uphold “public control” and “check the relevance of reading” according to institutional
or social values (Rosenblatt 1978: 69).  Emphasising the rights of the reader to more
freedom, to more creative forms of play, may then be a way of calling into question
such external standards, of making the act of reading more central and autonomous.
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Psychoanalysis, Deconstruction and the Notion of
Free Play
14 Interestingly, a significant number of theories that emphasise the autonomy of reading
have been written in French. Perhaps not coincidentally, the word “jeu” in French is
open to  a  much broader  range  of  interpretations  than  “game”  or  “play”,  enabling
thinkers to highlight the inherent dialectics between the logical rules of games, the
larger  notion  of  playing,  and  even  more  specific  meanings.  For  instance,  Roland
Barthes, in “Le plaisir du texte” proposed a conception of reading which would include
the  “logical  contradictions”  within  the  text  and  the  unpredictability  of  reading  as
“jouissance”, outside of the boundaries set by the rhetoric — in his own words: “que les
jeux ne soient pas faits, qu’il y ait un jeu” (Barthes 1973: 9-11. My emphasis). In this
sentence, he reuses the set phrase “les jeux sont faits”, or “the bets are off” which the
croupier  or  bookmaker  shouts  when  new  bets  are  no  longer  allowed,  thereby
introducing  another  fundamental  term  in  the  semantic  field  of  games  and  reader
theory: that of the gamble. The play of reading only intervenes if “bets are on”, if there
are still moves to make and chance involved. This defines another set of conceptions of
reading,  which  oppose  the  predetermined  parameters  of  structuralist  or
phenomenological reception-theories, in the same way that games of chance stand in
contrast to games of chess.
15 This  approach,  which focuses  on individual  readings,  their  idiosyncrasies  and their
relation  to  chance,  underlies  Picard’s  notion  of  reading  as  a  form  of  play.  Picard
stresses the similarities between the psychological relation towards games and towards
art. Both call for a form of psychological “adaptive function” which involves forms of
interpretation.  The  confrontation  with  artworks  and  with  situations  within  games
conjures up a half-way space between reality and fiction, with its own set of rules and
possibilities.  Taking  up  Freudian  concepts,  Picard  identifies  texts  in  particular  as
“transitional objects” between the mind’s freedom and the resistance of the outside
world  (Picard  1986:  102).  They  enable  the  reader  to  experiment  with  interactions,
dissociating  them  from  a  specific  context  to  manipulate  them,  through  a  double
mechanism  that  is  both  defensive  and  constructive  (27-30).  It  is  not  a  question  of
committing  to  a  role,  as  in  Iser’s  theory,  but  on  the  contrary  of  trying  on  many
situations and postures for size. According to Picard, this Protean and creative path
through the text is the very essence of the game the reader plays (Picard 1986: 93-4).
16 However,  involving chance decisions  and the freedom to  hop from one position to
another does not make the reading process haphazard. Because the reader is producing
his own reading, “il joue gros jeu”, as Picard puts it, that is to say, risks are involved.
And Picard emphasises the two complementary psychological dangers that haunt every
reader: getting caught up in the game, losing perspective to blindly follow a reductive
reading path, or — to borrow a word coined by Donald Winnicott — “fantasying”, that is
following individual musings to the point of solipsism (Picard 1986: 120). Iser remarked
that good fiction always oscillates between involving readers further and distancing
them from the action (Iser 1978: 286). Picard sees this rhetorical balancing-act as a set
of  psychological  safeguards  which  reveal  that  every  interaction  with  literary  texts
walks the line between over-involvement and indifference. Far from being marginal
phenomena, these unwarranted effects are part and parcel of the reading process and
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can be  explained within Picard’s  theory as  the  direct  consequences  of  the  reader’s
freedom and risk-taking.
17 Thus, the conception of reading as free play replaces the opposition between objective
“good” and “bad” reading with questions on what it means subjectively to choose a
certain path: to adhere to a simplistic view of a complex text or to forget its otherness,
which Picard likens to the “resistance” of reality, in order to let one’s own ideas have
free reign. All reactions are possible, all are within the framework of these theories, but
they have different implications, and call upon what Hillis Miller calls an “ethics of
reading”,  in  the  sense  that  each  reading  implicates  the  reader  who  “must take
responsibility for it” (Miller 1987: 59).
18 The  relation  between  play  and  responsibility  in  the  context  of  reading  has  been
particularly important in the deconstructionist movement, and has been theorised at
length by Derrida. From the start of his philosophical career, Derrida sought to liberate
what he called the pluri-dimensional “problem of reading” from unilateral visions of
meaning (Derrida 1967a: 31). In De la grammatologie (1967), he claims that writing and
reading existed before their subjection to a theory of meaning, which is a more recent,
historical phenomenon (130). He also construes a new theory of “play” (“jeu”) which
precisely articulates the notions of free play and structured games. Taking up a very
specific meaning of “jeu” in French as the ‘looseness’ within a mechanism (like a lock)
which gives a small margin to work with, Derrida affirms that a form of play derives
from the very fact that perfect,  totalising structures,  although they may serve as a
regulatory ideal, have no actual existence. They are thought of as centres, but in fact
constitute only “vanishing points” caught within the structure of “différence”, in the
differential between many objects and events, none of which can be the true standard
for the others (Derrida 1967b: 423). This applies readily to theories of reading analysed
earlier: it is only in how they differ from the ideal of a Model or Implied Reader that
individual  readings  acquire  their  singular  existence.  Standard  readings  are  not  the
most pertinent interpretation, but merely representations of all the protocols that are
at play to regulate individual readings and make them go through sufficiently similar
motions for them to be compared. In the end, these “standard readings” have nothing
to  say  about  what  actually  happens  when we read,  that  is  to  say  the  uncontrolled
mechanics of differentiation and dissemination by which my reading differs from yours,
and even differs from my reading of the same text at a different moment. Michel Lisse, in
his  works on Derrida’s  conception of  the reading process,  calls  this  the “logics of  ‘
maybe’”. The question is not to reject any regulatory interpretative model based on
etymological of philological facts, but, in Derrida’s words, to oppose all “philological
fundamentalism” which would erase the possibility of an eye-opening “invention” on
the reader’s part (Lisse 2001: 49). Speaking about Mallarmé, Derrida likens this to the
notion of the “roll of the dice” in the poet’s works:
Le  hasard  ou  le  coup de  dés  qui  “ouvrent”  un tel  texte  ne  contredisent  pas  la
nécessité rigoureuse de son agencement formel. Le jeu est ici l’unité du hasard et de
la règle, du programme et de son reste ou de son surplus. (Derrida 1972: 62)
19 Every new reading is a composite of probability and chance: it  is  probable that the
reader will take a cue within the text, understand a reference, follow a beaten path,
since that is where the text’s structure leads. But at every turn, there is an opening, a
“surplus”.  The  play  stems from the  looseness  of  the  mechanism,  in  its  inability  to
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actually be all-encompassing and at one with itself,  which opens up the space for a
broader form of play.
20 This conception also enables Derrida to assert the seriousness of what he calls “jeu”. In
“Plato’s Pharmacy”, he argues that it is only possible to relegate play to the notion of a
fun diversion, of games, when there exists a “serious” underlying structure to which it
can  be  compared.  The  “controlled  and  contained”  reflection  on  “fun,”  alternate
readings only works when the distinction with the serious, true meaning of a work is
supposed to be founded on solid grounds. If  the authoritative notion of the faithful
“cooperative” reading is only an abstract ideal, then all takes on a text are serious on
some level. Derrida theorises this possibility through the notion of “coup”, playing on
the large range of meanings that this word can take: nuances like that of striking (as in
a political coup, but also a stroke of luck), of dramatic momentum (the coup de théâtre)
and, of course, that of the gamble, since a roll of the dice is “un coup de dé” (Derrida
1972: 180; 192). At each juncture, for each word of the text, there exists the inherent
possibility for the reader to enact one of  these “coups”,  be it  a  stroke of  genius —
finding  a  hitherto  hidden chain  of  connotations  that  hints  at  a  character’s  hidden
motive, or a subdued undercurrent that runs counter to the main narrative — or a
personal, whimsical reversal of meaning. This is why every reading is an event, even if
the text is the same — like any game of roulette or blackjack is a new, incalculable
gamble, even if the parameters haven’t changed since the last game which follows the
same rules. Someone may always have a stroke of luck, and someone can always decide
to hold up the casino.
21 One of the common points of these different meanings of “coup”, however, is that they
all involve some form of contextual value. A political coup, even a coup de théâtre, imply
that  there  was  a  dramatic  situation  —  real  or  fictional  —,  in  which  the  action
intervened. Like in a casino, there is always something at stake in play understood as a
“coup”. This is why Derrida rejects the idea that play equals “licence”, and affirms the
“severity” of his perspective. Just like Picard, he replaces objective notions of “good”
and “bad” with subjective postures,  “licence” and “severity”.  Once again, the set of
values which he posits is based on the relation to an Other, to exteriority. The “text of
the  other”,  in  its  singularity,  calls  for  a  “responsible  response”,  which  puts  the
respondent’s singularity “at stake” (in Dutoit and Romanski 2009: 199). This complex
and compressed statement undoubtedly requires analysis, but it points towards the two
questions that must be answered in order to gain a full understanding of the act of
reading: how it relates to the otherness of the text, and what we concretely put at stake
when we open a book, the exact nature and parameters of our commitment.
 
Understanding the Stakes: Interpellation and its
counter-play
22 Theories of reading rely on the basic idea that the text in some way calls towards its
readers, creating a tension between our ordinary way of reacting to people and events
and a certain role that it assigns to us within its structure. Iser considers this call, and
the  fact  that  the  author  “sketches  an  image  of  himself  and  his  reader”  in  certain
positions, as the source of a tension which is consubstantial with the very notion of an
“implicit reader” (Iser 1976: 73). But the concrete explanation for this tension, which
implies  a  force  acting  upon  the  individual,  differs  considerably  depending  on  the
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thinker.  As  Paul  B.  Armstrong  puts  it,  calling  upon  the  Sartrian  reflections  on
literature,  the  possibility  of  mutual  recognition  between author  and reader  cannot
completely hide the fact that “power is also at work in reading” (Armstrong 2005: 5).
Furthermore, American theoreticians of reader response like Stanley Fish have stressed
the social and cultural aspect of this relation of power. According to Fish, taking up a
certain way of reading is a politically motivated action, which places the reader within
a certain “interpretive community” (Fish 1980: 16). Rejecting the idea that texts can
bear illocutory power — an idea which runs directly counter to Iser, as seen above —
Fish argues that they in fact borrow it from their context, that certain readers, within
certain communities “accept the underlying setting” which enables the textual rhetoric
to function (Fish 1980: 230).
23 Thus, the concrete relation between a text’s structure, its effect on the reader, and the
social forces at play in the cultural world needs to be understood in order to define how
these  three  instances  — text,  reader  and social  world  — interact.  In  this  task,  the
models developed by Marxist pragmatics, and particularly in the works of Jean-Jacques
Lecercle on what he calls the ALTER structure, provide a number of cogent responses.
Lecercle  understands  the  “call”  of  the  text  through  the  Althusserian  notion  of
“interpellation” as a process which uses historically determined institutional relations
of power to make its readers — as well as authors — adopt socially accepted patterns of
response and behaviour (Lecercle 1999: 75). Instead of imagining that the written word
has  its  own  power  to  make  readers  follow  certain  paths  and  understand  certain
references,  Lecercle argues that texts (the T in ALTER) borrow both their linguistic
structures (the L in ALTER) and web of connotations (the “encyclopedia” or E) from the
external  state  of  a  certain  language  and  a  certain  culture,  and  that  these  in  turn
determine socially coded positions (“actantial places”) for the author and reader (A and
R). In other words, the rhetoric of a text relies on the fact that readers are human
beings in a certain society, and that they will respond to certain recognisable forms of
discourses as they do in the rest of their lives, respecting the literary author like they
respect other forms of authority — or, in certain social contexts, respecting them as
little, and acting overtly against certain frames and clichés.
24 This  is  how Lecercle  overcomes the limitations that  he sees  in Iser’s  “aesthetics  of
negativity”, as wells as other theories which acknowledge the fact that rules can be
broken but cannot fully grasp the “duality of activity and constraint” that defines the
real agency of the reader (Lecercle 1999: 90-1). Lecercle argues that reading is entirely
“le jeu d’une structure”, that is a structure both “at work” and “at play”. On the one
hand,  its  constraints,  like  all  social  structures,  live  on  and  are  reinforced  through
“sedimentation”:  if  many  people  read  trying  to  emulate  the  structures  of  Model
Readers,  or  to  follow  the  will  that  they  attribute  to  certain  Author-figures,  and  if
reading is taught that way, it becomes an increasingly strong norm. But structures are
also historically determined, and every new act of reading, like the Derridean “coup”,
can “break the crust” and be part of a broader “insurrection” within culture (Lecercle
1999: 166). It then has to face the defensive reactions of cultural institutions. University
professors and cultural journalists are bound to rail against “eccentric” or “subversive”
readings, which any Marxist will take as proof that there indeed was a spark in the
struggle for the control of the cultural field. This explains how free forms of reading
are always possible but how, in practice,  standard readings are statistically normal:
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opposing the rules amounts to taking a risky social stance, struggling with powerful,
long-established institutions.
25 However,  Lecercle  asserts  that  resistance  to  interpellations  —  what  he  calls
“imposture” — may use the very framework of the ALTER structure, albeit in a different
way. Real subversion does not consist in explicitly opposing all social forces, since there
is no standpoint, no language or tradition, that is completely outside these forces. They
must be challenged from the inside. This is the meaning of “counter-interpellation”: if
every  text  borrows  from  the  structures  of  a  cultural  field,  it  means  that  these
structures are at play within it, liable to be subverted by a new composition or a new
interpretation.  Giving  new  meanings  to  words,  changing  the  connotation  and
implications  of  certain  phrases  (which  Lecercle  likens  to  the  Butlerian  notion  of
“reworking”,  Lecercle  1999:  164-5),  and  even  giving  a  completely  revisionist
interpretation of certain narratives, can have effects on the entire cultural framework
of a society.  Such a perspective also ties in with Michel de Certeau’s reflections on
culture  and  reading.  Certeau  envisions  reading  as  an  “operative  process”  of
“reappropriation” of  cultural  codes  which constantly  updates  old  norms,  and stops
them from unilaterally  exerting  oppressive  power  (Certeau  1980:  11).  In  this  ever-
renewed  struggle,  which  he  calls  the  “fundamental  polemology”  of  language,  he
distinguishes between effects of strategy, that is institutionally imposed norms — how
school programs and university curriculums teach people how to read — and effects of
tactics, or individual resistances and “coups” (“playing on the occasion”) that readers
undertake to express their own, personal take on a text (Certeau 1980: 21).
26 This  means  that  what  is  at  stake  in  reading,  although of  course  to  widely  varying
degrees, is not only the posture of the individual, but also the cultural institutions and
even the meaning of words. Of course, most readings don’t fundamentally change a
culture — for that would result in a nightmarish chaos — but de jure, any of them could.
The  rest  is  a  question  of  the  individual’s  relation  to  the  whole  of  society,  of  the
interplay between individual moves and large-scale political  and cultural  strategies.
And,  as  Certeau  remarks,  this  very  interaction  is  the  source  of  a  certain  type  of
playfulness. From Zun Tsu’s Art of War and the Chinese Book of Changes to the Arabic
Book of Subtle Ruse, the memory of certain “coups” has become the sources of narratives
and even new forms of games, where the goal is to invert the relation of force, to make
the  weak  triumph  over  the  strong  (Certeau  1980:  64-7).  Reading  can  be  played
according  to  the  rules,  but  it  is  always  haunted  by  the  possibility  of  becoming  a
challenge, an act of defiance towards the cultural institutions that establish and govern
those rules.
 
The Challenge and the Revelation: Reading as agôn
27 Hence, from the perspective of Marxist pragmatics, the interaction between reader and
text bears not only on their abstract status in a hypothetical Republic of readers and
writers divorced from the world of everyday interactions. Who we are when we shop or
eat, work for a salary or vote to elect our political leaders, and who we are when we
interpret texts, are all interrelated. Hence, the forces at work to define the balance of
political  power  or  the  redistribution  of  riches  are  directly  linked  with  those  that
preside over our interpretations and our imagination. That is the very definition of
“ideology” as “the imaginary relation to the real conditions of living” (Althusser 1976:
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101). Culture, far from being immaterial, informs and changes our relation to the most
concrete aspects of our everyday life.
28 With  this  in  mind,  it  becomes  easier  to  understand  why  most  phenomenological
approaches,  and  even  some  advocates  of  free  play,  fail  to  grasp  the  full  stakes  of
reading. For as we have seen, notions like that of the illocutory force of literature, its
effect  upon  the  reader,  and  even  that  of  commitment,  are  generally  in  line  with
phenomenological theories. Jauss, for instance, shows how texts can “interrogate” their
interpreter and make readers call into question their own preconceptions, going so far
as to use the idea of “interpellation”. He also defends the reader’s right to question the
text in return, to “counter-question” (Jauss 1889: 57-9; 94). However, he asserts that
literary hermeneutics must function in such a way that “the quarrel of interpretations
does not end with a struggle to the death, like in politics”. He argues for a respectful
and pacific  vision of  interpretation,  where only a  better  mutual  understanding can
justify new questions (439-440).
29 First of all, this stems from what I would argue is a flawed reading of Hegel. In the
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), the struggle to the death is a pre-political phase which
institutes the power relations between humans through the “master-slave dialectics”
(Hegel 1971: 158-61). This does not in any way mean that later phases of dialectics in
Hegelian thought do not include deadly conflict, which is a fundamental drive in his
vision of  human affairs,  the “work of  the negative”.  Unlike later phenomenological
thought, and the communicational theories of Habermas, Hegel’s phenomenology gives
conflict  and  struggles  a  decisive  role  to  play  in  the  movement  of  History.  Most
importantly,  the  dichotomy  that  Jauss  proposes  between  literature  and  politics
deliberately  ignores  the  fact  that  what  texts  reveal  about  their  readers,  and  what
readers reveal about the texts that they encounter, have very much to do with the
struggles of politics. As Lecercle argues in De l’interpellation (2019), there is no clear-cut
division between the “communicational”  and “strategic”  value  of  interpellation,  no
way to distinguish between its rational appeal and underlying rhetorical effects. The
two are intertwined,  and separating them is  in itself  a  politically consequential  act
which underlies the bias of a certain phenomenological standpoint (Lecercle 2019: 12).
30 Likewise, Picard’s insistence on personal and psychological discovery seems to forget
that individuals and psyches do not exist in limbo and are always inscribed within a
social and cultural order. When he asserts that the confrontation to modern texts and
their new “protocols of readings” makes traditional protocols moot and reveals new
possibilities,  Picard  should  continue  by  noting  that  these  protocols  are  linked  to
broader  cultural  and political  issues  (Picard 1986:  249).  And when he explains  that
confronting the risks of reading is a way to “put one’s identity and unity on trial, at
stake”,  and  to  acquire  a  new  form  of  self-knowledge  relating  to  our  identity  and
unconscious, he does not say that this knowledge is not solely intimate, that it bears on
our relations to others — which he does imply — and also on our status as social and
cultural agents.
31 This is why the notion of agôn is so apposite in re-defining the activity of reading. This
Greek  term  connotes  a  form  of  game,  of  friendly  competition  divided  from  the
struggles  of  everyday  life.  The  Olympics  of  Ancient  Greece  were  a  period  of  truce
between warring cities, just like reading does undeniably distance us from the material
problems and urgencies of our existence. Yet during this truce, the competitions were
serious, because the games being played were deemed to reveal the inmost truth of the
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competitors.  The  confrontation with  others,  and with  the  limits  of  one’s  body and
mind, was a form of trial which brought to light one’s true mettle. Similarly, in the
world of ideas, the confrontation with texts and with the readings and interpretations
of others, is a way to put one’s own preconceptions and the limits of one’s faculties of
imagination on trial. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari put it, the agôn of ideas ruled
the  Greek  “society  of  friends”  within  the  city  and,  by  extension,  within  the
philosophical community: it was the standard by which each thinker’s “pretensions” to
truth or to faithfulness to an idea could be judged (Deleuze & Guattari 1991: 11). Instead
of  trying  to  judge  reading  through  some  external,  neutral  standard,  a  theory  of
agonistics thus argues that the act of reading itself can set and change values. It is a
source,  rather  than  an  object,  of  ethical  judgement.  When confronted  with  a  text,
readers find themselves at the intersection of different forces. Firstly, the originality of
the text itself, with its contextually determined set of rhetorical devices and discursive
strategies. Secondly, the multiple cultural and institutional prescriptions of a certain
social context, which depend on a myriad of factors — when and where the reader lives,
how educated they are, what Bourdieu would call their “cultural capital.” And, finally,
the idiosyncrasies of their own personal lives, their intimate relation to books, stories,
and  to  language.  All  these  forces  have  pretensions  to  inform  the  construction  of
meaning, and none of them has any transcendent right to its claim. By deciding to read
one way or another, to negotiate and arbitrate between all of these forces, the reader
intervenes in the power-dynamics in a way which is perhaps not ‘free’ in the sense of
‘free  will’,  but  always  constitutes  a  form  of  “coup”,  a  combination  that  cannot  be
determined in advance. This choice in turn reveals a lot, both about the forces at work,
which may be challenged in the process and appear under a new light, and about the
reader himself or herself. For if there is no “right” way of reading, every decision is
meaningful, and has something to say about the one who made it. What is more, if the
forces at work in the decision are inextricably intimate, cultural and social, then the
posture of the reader that is revealed through their interpretation bears on all of these
aspects of their identity. In the end, there is no good or bad reading, just a myriad of
motivated interpretations, and choosing one over the other says a great deal about who
we are.
32 This  overview  calls  for  two  complementary  explanations  regarding  conflict  and
cooperation  to  adequately  articulate  it  with  traditional  reception-theories.  Firstly,
agonistics  does  not  imply  that  conflict  is  the  fundamental  model  for  the  reading
process. It simply posits that it is not inherently marginal: cooperation and conflict are
two kinds of response to the challenge of a text and a context of reading, and both
should be studied on the same plane. Secondly, this does not make cooperation any less
ethical. I would argue that, on the contrary, there is something particularly abstract
and  unconvincing  about  the  way  in  which  some  theories  of  reading  construe
cooperation as a sort of transcendent, categorical imperative. Roger Sell, for instance,
claims that “A reader responding to a literary text is humanly obliged to give its writer
a hearing”, while “misinterpret[ing] the writer by imposing their own world view” is a
sort of amoral “temptation” (Sell 2011: 6). Such moralizing discourse, conjuring up a
vague notion of “human obligation”,  does not do justice to the complexity and the
dilemmas that readers face when they actually try to do justice to the otherness of the
text. It is precisely because they have no obligation to cooperate that choosing that
path is so interesting and valuable.
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33 This is what Derrida means when he talks about a “responsible response”. As Derek
Attridge  details  in  Reading  and  Responsibility  (2012),  the  fact  that  texts  and  reading
protocols do not have any inherent power and are dependent on how readers actually
respond  to  them  entails  more,  not  less,  responsibility.  This  requires  a  specific
understanding of the field of ethics, and Attridge shows how Derrida, particularly in his
dialogue  with  Emmanuel  Levinas,  came  to  assert  his  own  vision  of  that  particular
notion. Most importantly, Derrida differs from Levinas because he directly links the
violence of confrontation to ethical evaluation, “in the pure and immediate ethics of
the face to face” (Attridge 2012: 110), without resorting to a third, overarching term. As
Hillis Miller puts it in his Ethics of Reading, “each reading is strictly speaking ethical in
the sense that it has to take place, by an implacable necessity, as the response to a
categorical demand, and in the sense that the reader must take responsibility for it.”
(Miller 1976: 59). What is ethical is the fact that there is a confrontation, forces and
claims, which the reader cannot simply withdraw from by hiding behind a concept or a
protocol: we can decide to read how we want, but we can’t say that we didn’t decide, or
that the decision has nothing to do with who we are. Whatever choice we make, we
must accept that it expresses something about us.
34 To respond to the primary question, that is to say what game the reader is playing, I
believe we can draw from Derrida’s notion of signature and counter-signature which he
defines  as  “a  duel  of  writing  and  reading”  (Dutoit  and  Romanski  2009:  287).  The
question of what rules this duel follows, whether it takes the form of a chess match, a
choreography, or a gamble, are secondary when compared to its stakes. In the choice of
the protocol,  in the oscillations between following and betraying the text,  we must
commit and open ourselves to be pierced and revealed, just like we may pierce and
reveal  some  meaning  that  no  other  reading  had  brought  to  light.  “Promettre  de  se
compromettre”. These are Derrida’s exact words: to promise to commit, to promise to
compromise and question your identity coming in, and to promise to respond to the
challenge that the text confronts you with, whichever way you choose to do so.
 
Conclusion
35 In the end, the agonistics of reading adheres to the metaphor of reading as a form of
play or game, but rejects traditional connotations of these words. It asserts that play is
in fact a very serious activity, which we use to reveal, challenge and inform our identity
as individuals, both psychologically and socially. That is the meaning of agôn as I have
used it here.
36 In consequence, theoreticians of reading must continue to elaborate models of socially
normative readings, with a contextual and historical framework in mind, seeing them
not as overarching structures set in stone, but as institutions linked to broader political
and  social  trends.  Furthermore,  they  must  endeavour  to  evaluate  individual
interpretations, whether it be those confirmed by documentary evidence at a certain
time and place, or their own readings, as so many “coups”, meaningful and revelatory
responses to the call of the text. They must analyse the way in which such readings
reinforce or call  into question certain standards — academic standards of  a  “good”
reading,  social  standards  of  “common  sense”,  political  standards  of  “biased”  or
“ideological” interpretations, and so on — while always trying to bring to the fore the
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relative  singularity  of  each  interpretation,  and  the  way  in  which  even  faithfulness
requires adapting the meaning to a new, original context.
37 This will always entail acts of judgement, a commitment on the part of the theoretician,
so that no perspective on reading can be purely theoretical, the contemplation of an
objective truth. On the contrary, the only ethically wrong vision of reading is the one
that tries to do away with responsibility, to say that some interpretations are neutral
and non-committal because they adhere to an objective standard. This vision, however
abstract it may seem, is both logically untenable and politically pernicious. It relegates
the texts and the readings that it cannot comprehend to a form of aberrant margin, and
tries to divorce the forces at work in art and those that govern everyday life, thereby
stripping  artistic  and  interpretive  agency  of  their  political  value.  As  Jean-François
Lyotard asserted, the only way to break away from the reductive, normative standards
of communication, and the Terror they exert on language by eliminating subversion
and resistance from their  models,  is  a  “game theory” of  interpretation as  “general
agonistics” (Lyotard 1980: 23).
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ABSTRACTS
From Michel Picard’s La lecture comme jeu to Umberto Eco’s model of the “game of chess”, reading
has often been compared to a kind of game. Games serve as a useful template of interaction,
highlighting both the exterior set of rules governing an activity, and the agency that these rules
leave  to  the  individual.  Yet  games  are  also  a  constitutive  human  activity,  with  myriads  of
variants, from the free play of children to the gambler’s thrill to the highly ritualized sets of
actions and reactions seen in martial arts or chess. This article proposes to review classical and
contemporary theories of reading based on their specific use of the metaphor of reading as a
game. It first presents the structuralist and phenomenological approaches, which tend to define
reading as a performance based on pre-established rules, like a game of chess. It then delves into
theories  that  instead  choose  to  highlight  the  incalculable  aspect  of  every  new  reading,  the
possibility for the reader to go off the beaten path. These tend to see reading more as a game of
chance  than  a  game  of  chess.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  they  construe  reading  as
licentious: gambles involve stakes. Theories like Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s Marxist pragmatics are
most specific in explaining what the reader is actually committing to. The stance we take, our
interaction with texts as “interpellations”, are part and parcel of our lives as social and political
beings. They are the products of a certain context, but they may in turn influence or call into
question the very structures that make them possible. This is why this article suggests reading be
examined through the notion of agonistics. Taking up the ancient Greek word “agôn”, which
implies  that  games  are  forms  of  trial  made  to  reveal  something  of  the  player’s  nature,  the
agonistics of reading posits that reading must not be seen as an isolated phenomenon. On the
contrary, the challenge that texts pose, to confront them or to accept them, is fundamental in the
construction of our identity as readers and as human beings. This dialectics of self-revelation and
self-construction, through the interaction with texts, is the often unspoken yet decisive game
that every reader plays.
De l’ouvrage de Michel Picard, La lecture comme jeu, au modèle du « jeu d’échecs » proposé par
Umberto Eco, la lecture a souvent été comparée au jeu.  De fait,  le schéma du jeu permet de
penser l’interaction entre une série de règles externes et les possibilités d’action qu’elles laissent
à l’individu.  Mais  au-delà de ces  seules  structures,  le  jeu est  une activité  fondamentale  chez
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l’homme,  avec une infinité  de variations,  des  jeux d’imagination d’enfants  aux «  coups »  du
parieur,  et  aux  séries  ritualisées  d’actions  et  de  réactions  qui  composent  un  combat  d’arts
martiaux ou une partie d’échecs. Ainsi, cet article propose de passer en revue plusieurs théories
classiques et contemporaines de la lecture, en étudiant spécifiquement leur façon d’employer la
métaphore  de  la  lecture  comme  jeu.  Il  s’intéresse  d’abord  aux  théories  structuralistes  et
phénoménologiques,  qui  tendent  à  considérer  la  lecture  comme  l'application  de  règles  pré-
établies, comparable à un jeu d’échecs. Il est ensuite question des théories qui préfèrent éclairer
la liberté que possède tout lecteur de sortir des sentiers battus. Ces perspectives comparent plus
volontiers la lecture à un jeu de hasard qu’à un jeu d’échec : un « coup », qui comme le coup de dé
mallarméen « jamais n’abolira le hasard ». Mais le « coup » du parieur a toujours son enjeu. A ce
titre,  les  théories  comme  la  pragmatique  marxiste  de  Jean-Jacques  Lecercle  donnent  une
explication particulièrement pertinente de ce que la lecture met en jeu. Notre posture face aux
interpellations  des  textes  informe  notre  être  social  et  politique.  Voilà  pourquoi  cet  article
propose une vision de la lecture basée sur la notion d’agonistique. Reprenant le mot grec « agôn
»,  qui  fait  du jeu une épreuve révélatrice,  l’agonistique de la  lecture soutient  que les  textes
posent au lecteur un défi. En les réduisant à des protocoles préexistants ou en les ouvrant par
d’incalculables  «  coups  »,  nous  participons  essentiellement  à  la  définition  de  notre  propre
identité,  en tant que lecteur et en tant qu’être humain. Cette dialectique de révélation et de
construction de soi,  par l’interaction avec les textes, est le jeu fondamental,  quoique souvent
passé sous silence, auquel se livre tout lecteur.
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